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SESSIONS V. DIMAYA: VAGUENESS
DOCTRINE & DEPORTATION
STATUTES
MATTHEW GIBBONS*
INTRODUCTION
Through a convoluted legal pathway a nonviolent crime can be
classified as a violent crime, transported into civil law, and result in the
deportation of someone who has been legally present in the United
States for nearly twenty years. Such is the case in Sessions v. Dimaya.1
Dimaya presents the Supreme Court with the chance to correct that
injustice by (again) holding deportation to be a penalty akin to
criminal punishment, and by recognizing the applicability of
vagueness doctrine to statutes resulting in deportation. This
commentary argues that would be the proper outcome in Dimaya for
three reasons. First, the doctrine of stare decisis requires it. Second,
this outcome conforms with the principles underlying the doctrine of
unconstitutional vagueness. Third and finally, failure to extend that
doctrine—in the form of the criminal vagueness standard—to this
case would appear politically motivated and inconsistent. The
appearance of extra-judicial political influence reduces the legitimacy,
and thereby the effectiveness, of the judiciary.
I. FACTS
Respondent James Dimaya was admitted to the United States and
became a lawful permanent resident in 1992.2 Mr. Dimaya pleaded no
contest to,3 and was convicted of, first-degree residential burglary4 in
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1. Sessions v. Dimaya, No. 15-1498 (U.S. 2017)
2. Brief for Respondent at 5, Sessions v. Dimaya, NO. 15-1498 (U.S. 2016) [hereinafter
Brief for Respondent].
3. Id.
4. Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1111 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 31
(2016), reh’g granted sub nom. Sessions v. Dimaya, NO. 15-1498 (U.S. 2017).
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California twice (once in 2007 and once in 2009).5 He was sentenced
to two years in prison for each offense.6
In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal
proceedings against Mr. Dimaya.7 An immigration judge determined
that California’s first-degree burglary is a crime of violence,8 found
Mr. Dimaya removable from the United States and ordered him
removed.9 The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) agreed and
dismissed his appeal.10 The Ninth Circuit granted Mr. Dimaya’s
petition for review and remanded his case to the BIA after finding a
criminal statute, incorporated as a definition into the civil removal
law, to be void for vagueness11 in accordance with Johnson v. United
States.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and after oral
argument on January 17, 2017, the case was set for reargument on
October 2, 2017.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
At issue in Dimaya is the interaction between the constitutional
vagueness doctrine (typically applicable to criminal law) and civil
immigration laws which incorporate criminal laws by reference and
result in deportation.
A. Vagueness Doctrine
The vagueness doctrine stems from the Fifth Amendment, which
guarantees that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”13 The United States Supreme
Court “establish[ed] that the Government violates this guarantee by
taking away someone’s life, liberty, or property under a criminal law
so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct
5. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 459, 460(a) (West 2017).
6. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Sessions v. Dimaya, NO. 15-1498 (U.S. 2016) [hereinafter Brief
for Petitioner].
7. Id.
8. Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1112.
9. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 4.
10. Id. at 4–5.
11. Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1120.
12. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); accord Baptiste v. Attorney Gen., 841
F.3d 601, 604 (3d Cir. 2016); Golicov v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 1075 (10th Cir. 2016); Shuti v.
Lynch, 828 F.3d 440, 446 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir.
2015) (applying Johnson to find § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague). But see United States v.
Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670, 686 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (holding that the law was not
unconstitutionally vague).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.”14
By invalidating statutes which are so vague they violate this “first
essential of due process,” the Supreme Court enforces the Due
Process Clause and secures the rights of the people against their
government.15
B. Vagueness in an Immigration Context
In 1951, the Supreme Court analyzed an immigration statute using
the criminal standard of vagueness in Jordan v. De George.16 In
Jordan, like in Dimaya, the Court dealt with a vagueness challenge to
an immigration statute resulting in deportation. There, the Court
utilized the criminal vagueness standard to analyze an immigration
statute, even though the challenged statute was not criminal.17 The
Court stated two reasons to do so: first, applying vagueness doctrine
to non-criminal laws comports with the doctrine’s purpose of
providing notice.18 Second, the drastic effects of deportation function
as a penalty, like criminal penalties do.19
In the Jordan opinion, the Court discussed the applicable
vagueness standards in an immigration context. The Court initially
articulated that the “essential purpose of the ‘void for vagueness’
doctrine is to warn individuals of the criminal consequences of their
conduct.”20 Then the Court emphasized that the statute at issue was
an immigration statute which was not criminal in nature.21
Nonetheless “in view of the grave nature of deportation,” the Court
analyzed it under the criminal vagueness standard, “despite the fact
that [it was] not a criminal statute.”22

14. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–358 (1983)).
15. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (citing International Harvester
Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914)); see, e.g., Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563 (invalidating a
statute based on violation of Fifth Amendment due process).
16. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231–32 (1951).
17. Id. at 231.
18. See id. at 230 (explaining that the immigration statute’s “function is to apprise aliens of
the consequences which follow after conviction”).
19. See id. at 231 (“Despite the fact that this is not a criminal statute, we shall nevertheless
examine the application of the vagueness doctrine in this case. We do this in view of the grave
nature of deportation.”).
20. Id.
21. See id. (“It should be emphasized that this statute does not declare certain conduct to
be criminal.”).
22. Id. at 231.
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C. Vagueness in Residual Clauses
In Johnson v. United States,23 the Supreme Court held the Armed
Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) “residual clause”24 to be
unconstitutionally vague.25 ACCA statutorily raises minimum and
maximum prison sentences for certain violators.26 The ACCA residual
clause was one trigger for the harsher statutory sentences. The ACCA
residual clause, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), defined “violent felony”
as a crime punishable by a sentence of more than one year which, “is
burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.”27
The Supreme Court announced “[t]wo features” of the ACCA
residual clause “conspire[d] to make it unconstitutionally vague.”28
The first feature was that it created “uncertainty about how to
estimate the risk posed by a crime. It tie[d] the judicial assessment of
risk to a judicially imagined ‘ordinary case’ of a crime, not to real
world facts or statutory elements.”29 The second feature was that it
created “uncertainty about how much risk it [took] for a crime to
qualify as a violent felony.”30
Thus, the Johnson analysis of vagueness scrutinizes the
indeterminacy of a crime’s risk, and then the indeterminacy of how
much risk is required to invoke the applicable statute.31 As applied to
the ACCA residual clause in Johnson, these two factors resulted in
“more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process
Clause” allowed for.32 The Court held the ACCA residual
clause, § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), to be unconstitutionally vague.33
Two years later, however, the Supreme Court distinguished
Beckles v. United States34 from Johnson. Beckles asked whether a
residual clause in the Sentencing Guidelines, identical to the text of

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
See id. at 2555–56 (explaining the ACCA residual clause).
Id. at 2563.
18 U.S.C. § 924 (2012).
Id.
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.
Id.
Id. at 2558.
Id. at 2557–58.
Id. at 2558.
Id. at 2563.
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017).
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the ACCA residual clause, was also unconstitutionally vague.35 The
Court held that it was not.36 The Johnson ruling did not apply to the
Sentencing Guidelines because the Sentencing Guidelines, unlike the
ACCA, “merely guide the exercise of a court’s discretion in choosing
an appropriate sentence.”37
Beckles demonstrates Johnson’s holding that the ACCA residual
clause was unconstitutionally vague does not necessarily extend to
other instances of even the same text. In Beckles, that was because the
“[Sentencing] Guidelines are not subject to a vagueness challenge
under the Due Process Clause.”38 The Supreme Court has only
“invalidated two kinds of criminal laws as ‘void for vagueness’: laws
that define criminal offenses and laws that fix the permissible sentences
for criminal offenses.”39 The Sentencing Guidelines were neither.
D. The Convoluted Legal Pathway Intermingling Civil and Criminal
Law
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), “[a]ny alien who is convicted
of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”40
An “aggravated felony” is defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) as “a
crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, but not including
a purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at
least one year.”41 Both of these laws are civil laws. But the definition
incorporates by reference a criminal law. Under the 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)
“residual clause” (a criminal statute), a crime of violence is “any other
offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial
risk that physical force against the person or property of another may
be used in the course of committing the offense.”42
Therefore, there are two issues in the upcoming Dimaya case.
First, a civil law makes noncitizens removable if they are convicted of
an aggravated felony43 as defined by a criminal statute.44 Second, that

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 890.
Id. at 897.
Id. at 892.
Id.
Id.
8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012).
8 U.S.C. § 1101.
18 U.S.C. § 16 (2012).
8 U.S.C. § 1227.
8 U.S.C. § 1101.
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criminal statute includes a residual clause as indeterminate as the
ACCA residual clause struck down in Johnson for vagueness.45
III. HOLDING
The Ninth Circuit found § 16(b) to be unconstitutionally vague
and held that the constitutional vagueness doctrine applies to civil
statutes resulting in deportation.46
IV. ARGUMENTS
The parties in Sessions v. Dimaya essentially disagree on two
points. The threshold question is whether the Johnson analysis for
vagueness, a doctrine traditionally used in criminal law, applies to a
civil immigration statute which results in deportation and
incorporates a criminal law definition. The next question is whether
the incorporated criminal definition is unconstitutionally vague under
a Johnson analysis.
A. Applying Johnson vagueness analysis
Petitioner, the United States, argues that immigration removal
statutes are not subject to the Johnson vagueness analysis for three
reasons.47 First, Petitioner points to the fact that immigration removal
statutes are civil, but the vagueness doctrine has only historically
applied in full force to criminal laws.48 Petitioner supports this
argument in part by drawing on the statement in Jordan that
vagueness doctrine aims “to warn individuals of the criminal
consequences of their conduct,” highlighting that Jordan itself
emphasized the statute at issue was not criminal.49 Petitioner
concludes this argument by explaining that Jordan “did not [] hold—
in a case where the issue was not briefed or argued—that the same
[criminal] standard of definiteness applies to civil removal statutes.”50
Second, Petitioner claims that the constitutional values which
form the basis for the vagueness doctrine, fair notice and prevention

45. See, e.g., United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 720 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Section 16(b)
is materially indistinguishable from the ACCA’s [unconstitutionally vague] residual clause.”).
46. Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 31
(2016), reh’g granted sub nom. Sessions v. Dimaya, NO. 15-1498 (U.S. 2017).
47. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 13.
48. Id. at 14–19.
49. Id. at 19 (quoting Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 230 (1951)).
50. Id. at 20.
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of arbitrary enforcement, are not “implicated to remotely the same
extent” in an immigration context because removal proceedings are
not punishments in the way criminal penalties are.51 Fair notice is not
a concern because removal statutes, as civil statutes, are not subject to
the Ex Post Facto Clause.52 Arbitrary enforcement concerns are also
negated in the immigration context because, due to its close
connection to foreign relations and national security, the executive
branch has historically had broad authority in immigration
enforcement.53
Third, Petitioner argues the incorporation of a criminal provision
into a civil removal provision maintains the civil nature of the law. The
civil vagueness standard of “unintelligibility” therefore applies here,
and under that standard “[R]espondent was not denied due
process.”54 For those three reasons, Petitioner urges that the Johnson
analysis for vagueness not be applied to § 16(b) as it is incorporated
by immigration statutes.
Respondent, in contrast, argues that § 16(b) is subject to the
Johnson vagueness analysis when it is incorporated by reference into
deportation statutes.55 Respondent relies heavily on Jordan to support
this position. First, Respondent asserts that not only did “Jordan
[hold] that the standard vagueness analysis applies to deportation
statutes,”56 but also that since Jordan, the circuits have likewise held
deportation statutes to be susceptible to vagueness challenges under
that standard.57 Second, Respondent contends that overruling the
Jordan holding would be illogical because here, unlike the exclusively
civil consequences in Jordan,58 the provision at issue is in fact a
criminal statute.59
Third, Respondent argues that Jordan was correctly decided.60 In
support of this argument, Respondent points to the “severe
consequences and punitive characteristics that put [deportation
statutes] on par with criminal statutes.”61 Respondent also relates a
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 21.
Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 25–27.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 38.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 44.
Id.
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number of sources which illustrate that the civil/criminal distinction is
not necessarily the distinction upon which the relevant vagueness test
depends.62 Respondent’s final point is that, contrary to Petitioner’s
claims,63 deportation laws “raise the same concerns that underlie the
void-for-vagueness doctrine in the criminal context”; namely fair
notice and prevention of arbitrary enforcement.64
B. Does § 16(b) fail the Johnson vagueness analysis?
Petitioner argues that even if the Johnson criminal vagueness
standard is applied, § 16(b) is nonetheless sufficiently determinate.65
Petitioner contends that § 16(b) passes the Johnson analysis for three
reasons. First, § 16(b) is textually different than the ACCA residual
clause in a manner making it more determinate.66 Second, the fact that
§ 16(b) requires a court to apply a general standard of risk to an
ordinary case of an offense does not make it vague.67 Third, the
complicated judicial history of confusing precedents that was present
for the ACCA residual clause is absent for § 16(b).68 Petitioner also
adds that, if the Supreme Court were to find § 16(b)
unconstitutionally vague, there would be “deleterious consequences
for both criminal justice and immigration enforcement.”69
On the other hand, Respondent argues the § 16(b) residual clause
is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson.70 In the first place, § 16(b)
shares the two features of indeterminacy71 which “conspire[d] to make
[the ACCA residual clause] unconstitutionally vague.”72 As to the first
feature, “courts [are left] with nothing more than gut instinct,”
because § 16(b) provides “no meaningful guidance.”73 As to the

62. See id. at 47 (“[T]he civil/criminal line ‘is not an adequate distinction.’”) (citation
omitted).
63. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 20–25 (explaining why the respondent was not
denied due process under the vagueness standard appropriate for provisions applied in
immigration removal proceedings).
64. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 51–56 (explaining how deportation statutes
implicate concerns about fair notice and arbitrary enforcement).
65. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 28.
66. See id. at 29–39 (addressing how § 16(b) is drafted more precisely than the ACCA’s
residual clause).
67. Id. at 42.
68. Id. at 45–52.
69. Id. at 53.
70. Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 12.
71. Id. at 13–14.
72. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015).
73. Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 19.
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second feature, Respondent draws attention to the similar inability of
either the ACCA or § 16(b) residual clauses to identify the risk of the
“ordinary case” of any given crime.74
Respondent confronts Petitioner’s arguments regarding textual
differences between the residual clauses by noting and addressing
three textual differences. First, unlike the ACCA residual clause,
§ 16(b) contains a textual limitation: “in the course of committing the
offense.”75 But Respondent explains that, as it has been interpreted by
the courts, this phrase does not clarify meaning nor impose a
limitation.76 A second textual difference is that the ACCA residual
clause refers to “risk of physical injury,” but § 16(b) refers to risk of
“physical force.”77 Respondent notes that the two indicate the same
thing,78 but because injuries result in wounds while force may or may
not, if there is any difference in this respect, § 16(b) is more vague, not
less.79 Third, Respondent explains that § 16(b)’s lack of a list of crimes
compounds the provision’s indeterminacy by failing to provide any
examples of what the provision intends to prohibit.80 Finally,
Respondent rebuts Petitioner’s assertion § 16(b) lacks a confusing
history of case law by citing examples of the confusion generated by
§ 16(b).81
Respondent also explains that Petitioner’s arguments regarding
possible harmful consequences of finding the residual clause
unconstitutionally vague were also made in Johnson, where they
failed to persuade the Court.82 Respondent goes on to note that a
variety of convictions would satisfy the statutory definition of
aggravated felony even if § 16(b) were invalidated.83
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court should follow Jordan, apply the Johnson
vagueness analysis to deportation statutes, and strike § 16(b) as void
for vagueness. There is an inherent difficulty in defining the vagueness

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 15–17.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22–24.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 28–29.
See id. at 30–38 (“The § 16 residual clause has generated substantial confusion.”).
Id. at 56.
Id. at 59.
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required for a statute to violate Due Process: “there is no yardstick of
impermissible indeterminacy.”84 But in Dimaya, the Supreme Court
has a yardstick. The yardstick is the doctrine of stare decisis. That
doctrine, as well as the underpinnings of vagueness doctrine and the
judiciary’s need to avoid the appearance of improper influence, all
counsel the Court to affirm and hold § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague.
The consistent application of precedent provides the Court a
much-needed vagueness yardstick in this case for two reasons. First,
there is little difference between the unconstitutionally vague residual
clause in Johnson and the residual clause in § 16(b). Second, Jordan
illustrates a historical instance of the criminal standard of vagueness
doctrine extending to immigration statutes. Consistency and stare
decisis therefore dictate that vagueness doctrine should be applied to
statutes resulting in deportation, and that § 16(b) should be struck
down for vagueness.
Since deportation is a more significant sanction than many
criminal sanctions, applying vagueness doctrine here would give effect
to the doctrine’s purpose of “warn[ing] individuals of the criminal
consequences of their conduct.”85 Nearly a century ago the Supreme
Court recognized that “the Fifth Amendment affords protection in its
guarantee of due process” to aliens facing deportation because
deportation can result in those people being deprived “of all that
makes life worth living.”86 Many criminal sanctions deprive a
convicted violator of much less than that.
A law is impermissibly vague in violation of due process when it
“tak[es] away someone’s life, liberty, or property,” and is “so vague
that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it
punishes.”87 The Supreme Court’s recognition of deportation as a
punishment in Jordan thefore invites the application of vagueness
doctrine to deportation statutes regardless of their classification as
civil or criminal law.88 Applying the vagueness doctrine to deportation

84. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71
VA. L. REV. 189, 196 (1985).
85. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 230 (1951).
86. Ng Fung Ho et al. v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284–85 (1922).
87. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015).
88. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010) (“[A]s a matter of federal law,
deportation is an integral part . . . of the penalty that may be imposed.”); Fong Haw Tan v.
Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (“[Deportation] is the forfeiture for misconduct of a residence in
this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty.”).
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statutes will further its underlying principles because punishment and
notice are what matter, not a law’s classification.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court may be reluctant to apply Jordan
and Johnson here, because Beckles may have been a signal of the
Court’s intention to limit Johnson to its facts. If that is the case, the
Court can amplify the signal by upholding § 16(b). However, since
Dimaya shares crucial aspects of Johnson and Jordan, limiting
Johnson like the Court did in Beckles and disregarding Jordan would
invite criticism of inconsistency.
In Jordan, the Supreme Court analyzed an immigration statute
resulting in deportation under the vagueness doctrine.89 Consistency
thus necessitates a similar application of the established vagueness
doctrine even if the vagueness doctrine itself has changed in recent
years because of Johnson. And the Johnson vagueness analysis is not
somehow limited to provisions with a list of examples; rather, the
analysis is applicable to provisions which are exceedingly
indeterminate.90 The text of § 16(b), “any other offense that . . . by its
nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force . . . may be used
in the course of committing the offense,” is indeterminate.91 Thus a
Johnson vagueness analysis is necessary to determine the meaning of
the text.
For those reasons, failure to extend the vagueness doctrine to
deportation statutes would at least appear to be an inconsistent
application of the rule of law, and apparent inconsistencies result in
Frankfurter constraint violations.92 The “Frankfurter constraint”93 is
the idea that “courts will be effective and respected only if they are
able to construct doctrine that is persuasively determinate and
principled.”94 When the
results of a particular rule appear consistent, it is easier . . . to view
this rule [and its results] as properly judicial . . . . [When] the results

89. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 231.
90. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2561.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2012).
92. See, e.g., Jordan, 341 U.S. at 231 (“We shall . . . test this [deportation statute] under the
established criteria for the ‘void for vagueness’ doctrine.”); Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2551.
93. Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV.
125, 174; see generally FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL,
TANEY, AND WAITE (1937) (discussing Justice Frankfurter’s views on Commerce Clause
jurisprudence).
94. Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 95
(2004).
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appear inconsistent . . . it becomes easier for observers to view
these results as determined, or influenced, by factors external to
the rule.95

Actual extra-judicial influence is not necessary: Frankfurter
constraint violations require only the appearance that the judiciary be
influenced by extra-judicial factors. Because the judiciary is a
countermajoritarian
and
supposedly
apolitical
institution,
inconsistency leads to a perception of improper influence, which
decreases institutional legitimacy.
Because of modern hyper-politicization of immigration, the risk of
appearing influenced by extra-judicial factors in Dimaya is extremely
high, especially in the face of a history of Supreme Court statements
to the effect that, “the ex post facto Clause . . . should be applied to
deportation.”96 Failing to follow Jordan and Johnson would violate the
Frankfurter constraint. The Court should therefore find that the
vagueness doctrine extends to statutes resulting in deportation, and
that § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague.
Despite all this, the Court may rule in favor of Petitioner, and
could explain that ruling based on two factors. First, the Court may
draw a bright line between civil deportation and criminal punishment
and distinguish removal proceedings from criminal proceedings
because “[r]emoval is a civil, not criminal, matter.”97 Second, the
Court could invoke the time-honored plenary powers doctrine: “over
no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more
complete”98 than over immigration law, which is historically
“committed to the political branches of the Federal Government.”99
Although an outcome based on those two reasons in favor of
Petitioner is possible, those reasons are nonetheless insufficient to
outweigh Respondent’s argument. To conform with precedent,
advance the interests which underlie vagueness doctrine, and appear
unmotivated by extrajudicial forces, the court should rule that § 16(b)
is unconstitutionally vague.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Lessig, supra note 93, at 174.
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909).
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).
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CONCLUSION
To avoid the appearance of improper influence on judicial
decision making, courts must ensure the results of a particular rule
appear consistent. Despite an order for reargument, the Supreme
Court can avoid the risk of a political appearance in Dimaya. The
Supreme Court should formally recognize that the vagueness doctrine
extends to immigration statutes that result in deportation.
Consequently, the Supreme Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit and
find the residual clause of § 16(b) as incorporated by § 1101(a)(43)(F)
to be unconstitutionally vague.

